Legal Authority in Islam: Understanding Taqlid and Ijtihad

NOTE TO THE READER:
This article is based on notes and discussions from our class with Mawlana Zeeshan Chaudri. It’s not intended to be a thoroughly researched or evidence-based academic paper. My aim is simply to document what we’ve studied and also share it with other interested readers.

Introduction

The debate over taqlīd (following established legal rulings without investigating the evidence) and ijtihād (independent reasoning in legal matters) has been a central question for centuries. This discussion engages not only scholars but also students of knowledge and the general public. Should one follow the rulings of a madhhab, or strive for ijtihād when able? The answer, as always, depends on one’s level of knowledge and circumstances, and scholars across history have had a variety of views on this.

The Classical Debate on Taqlīd

The debate over taqlīd originally focused on whether ṭullāb and scholars could engage in taqlīd, rather than the layperson. Scholars like Imām al-Shawkānī, Ibn al-Qayyim, and to some extent, Ibn Taymiyyah, believed that once a person reached a certain level of knowledge where ijtihād was possible, they should not follow a madhhab rigidly. These scholars argued that strict adherence to a madhhab could stifle intellectual development and prevent scholars from directly engaging with the Qurʾān and Sunnah.

For example, Ibn al-Qayyim emphasised that taqlīd could be done out of necessity (ḍarūra) for those who were not yet able to perform ijtihād. However, he criticised the idea of scholars adhering to taqlīd their entire lives. He believed that, once they had the ability to derive rulings independently, continuing to follow a school of thought without engaging in their own reasoning was holding them back from reaching the truth.

On the other side of the debate, scholars like ʿAbd al-Ḥayy al-Lakhnawī and Rashīd Aḥmad Gangohī advocated for taqlīd shakhṣī: the idea that scholars and students should adhere to a single madhhab. They argued that ijtihād was difficult, and that legal consistency across time and place was more important. Madhhabs, they claimed, provided this consistency, ensuring that Islamic law didn’t become malleable or chaotic, which could undermine the rule of law in Muslim societies.

The Shift Away from Taqlīd

Why, then, did some scholars move away from taqlīd in more recent centuries? A significant shift occurred with the rise of modernist thought, particularly in the 19th century, when countries began adopting secular legal systems. The traditional authority of scholars started to dwindle, especially as printed books became more widely available and knowledge became democratised.

One notable figure in this revivalist movement was Shaykh al-Albānī, who championed the idea of tasfiyya and tarbiya — purifying Islamic practice by removing weak and fabricated hadiths and educating the masses on authentic knowledge. He strongly pushed the idea of a single ḥaqq (truth), rejecting adherence to any one madhhab and encouraging laypeople to also avoid rigid taqlīd. His influence helped fuel the spread of modern reformist thought that challenged the traditional madhhab-based approach.

Laypeople and Taqlīd

When it comes to the role of the layperson (ʿāmmi) in taqlīd, scholars are divided into two primary opinions:

The Layperson Does Have a Madhhab:
Other scholars, like Imam Ibn al-Qayyim, ʿAbd al-Ḥayy al-Lakhnawī, and Rashīd Aḥmad Gangohī, believe that even laypeople should adhere to a specific madhhab. They argue that because a layperson lacks the ability to engage with the evidence, they are not in a position to switch between different scholars or madhhabs based on convenience. Instead, they should consistently follow one madhhab (taqlīd shakhṣī) to avoid confusion and inconsistency. Scholars from this camp argue that a layperson claiming affiliation with a madhhab — even without deep knowledge of its evidence — provides legal and practical stability, as well as a structured approach to religious practice.

The Layperson Has No Madhhab (“la madhhaba lahu”):
Some scholars, like Imam Ibn al-ʿArabī, argue that a layperson doesn’t technically adhere to a specific madhhab. According to this view, when a layperson seeks a fatwa, they simply ask a scholar, “What does Allah and His Messenger want from me?” and follow the response without needing to question the evidence (dalīl). For Ibn al-ʿArabī, this act of following the scholar’s advice without investigating the proofs is not taqlīd but rather a straightforward act of trust in the scholar’s judgment.

Permissibility of Talfiq

Talfiq refers to the practice of combining rulings from different madhhabs in a way that no single madhhab would consider valid on its own. Scholars have long debated its permissibility, especially in cases where rulings from different schools are applied to a single legal issue.

Three Types of Talfiq

Talfiq can occur in three distinct scenarios:

1. When two rulings are directly related:
   Most scholars consider this type of talfiq to be bāṭil (invalid), as it involves mixing rulings in ways that contradict each other. However, there are some exceptions. Scholars like Mulla Farrukh in al-Qawl as-Sadīd and al-Dasūqī in the Mālikī school permitted this type in certain cases.
2. When two rulings are not immediately related but are connected in the larger scenario:
   This form of talfiq occurs when a mukallaf acts on two separate rulings in distinct issues, but those issues are connected when viewed as part of a larger scenario. In this case, talfiq is generally not permitted. For example, consider someone who marries without a walī following the Ḥanafī opinion, then gives a ba’in divorce through allusive terms, which is considered irrevocable in the Ḥanafī school. But later, the person follows the Shāfiʿī opinion that the divorce is rajʿī (revocable). Even though these are two separate issues, they are linked because both rulings impact the marital contract and divorce process. This kind of talfiq is generally rejected by scholars.
3. When two rulings are entirely unrelated:
   If the rulings are not connected in any way (e.g., taking one masʾala in fasting and another in prayer), scholars generally agree that this form of talfiq is permissible. There is consensus among those who believe that a layperson (ʿāmmi) does not have a specific madhhab (al-ʿāmmi la madhhab lahu). Ibn ʿĀbidīn mentions that if a layperson wishes, they can pray according to the Ḥanafī school one day and the Shāfiʿī school the next, as long as the rulings don’t conflict within the same act of worship.

There is also a minority position, even within the Ḥanafī school, that allows for talfiq in specific cases where precaution (iḥtiyāṭ) is necessary. For example, a Ḥanafī might follow the Shāfiʿī ruling on bleeding not breaking wuḍūʾ if they are unsure whether their minor bleeding would invalidate their prayer. This precautionary approach (iḥtiyāṭ) is intended to safeguard religious duties, particularly in situations of uncertainty or difficulty. Scholars who allow for this kind of talfiq emphasise that it should not be used to seek personal convenience but as a means of ensuring adherence to the commands of Allah.

One common example people use to illustrate talfiq is the combination of the Ḥanafī opinion that bleeding does not break wuḍūʾ and the Shāfiʿī opinion that physical contact with a spouse does not break wuḍūʾ. Some argue that this is an example of following personal desires (ittibāʿ al-hawā), where the person seeks ease by choosing rulings that are most convenient. However, the issue at hand is not simply about following desires, but rather about understanding this as a legal issue with its own complexities.

Most scholars still maintain that talfiq should not be allowed when the rulings are related, as it risks undermining the integrity of Islamic legal rulings. Yet, there are scholars who offer flexibility in certain cases, especially when talfiq helps ease difficulty in matters of ʿibādāt (worship), as long as it does not lead to contradictions within a single legal issue.

When Can We Follow Easier Rulings?

A related issue is the difference between tatabbuʿ al-rukhaṣ (seeking out easier rulings from different madhhabs) and ittibāʿ al-rukhaṣ (following a dispensation out of genuine need). Most scholars deem tatabbuʿ al-rukhaṣ to be impermissible because it opens the door to following personal desires instead of sincerely fulfilling religious obligations. The intention behind such behaviour moves away from being mukallaf -someone who is subject to hardship and accountability under Islamic law – and instead focuses on minimizing personal difficulty, often by selectively choosing opinions that align with one’s desires.

In these cases, a person’s goal is no longer to uphold the laws and fulfill the responsibilities Allah has imposed, but to see whether they can find a legal label or fatwa that approves what they want to do. This shift in intention can undermine the purpose of taklīf (being bound to Islamic law) because the person’s focus is no longer on striving to adhere to religious duties, but rather on finding a loophole to justify convenience.

On the other hand, ittibāʿ al-rukhaṣ is permissible in cases of genuine necessity or hardship (ḍarūra or ḥaraj). For example, a traveler is allowed to shorten their prayers, and someone who is ill may break their fast during Ramaḍān. The key difference here is intention: ittibāʿ al-rukhaṣ is motivated by legitimate difficulty and the need for ease in fulfilling obligations, whereas tatabbuʿ al-rukhaṣ reflects an attempt to escape those obligations without legitimate need.

Scholars like Ibn Humām and Ibn ʿĀmir al-Ḥajj emphasised that while following easier rulings in times of hardship is acceptable, using this as a strategy to trivialise religious commands or treat Islamic law as something convenient undermines the seriousness of divine obligations. They warned that this approach not only weakens one’s relationship with the legal framework of Islam but also leads to following personal desires rather than submitting to the rulings of Allah.

Are All Madhhabs Correct?

A central question in Islamic legal thought is whether all madhhabs are equally valid, or if only one of them can represent the true legal ruling (ḥaqq). This is often debated in terms of two positions: musawwiba (those who believe all positions derived through ijtihād are correct) and mukhattiʾa (those who believe only one position is correct, though the mujtahid who errs is still rewarded for their effort).

The majority opinion within Ahl al-Sunnah is that there is only one ultimate truth (ḥaqq), but scholars can still arrive at different valid conclusions through ijtihād. The famous ḥadīth of the Prophet ﷺ, which says that a mujtahid who makes the correct ruling receives two rewards, and one who errs still receives one, is often cited in this regard.

Following this, many scholars adopt the view that “our madhhab is correct with the potential of being wrong, and the other madhhabs are wrong with the potential of being correct” (qawlī ḥaqq bi-iḥtimāl al-khaṭāʾ, wa qawluhum khaṭāʾ bi-iḥtimāl al-ṣawāb). This means that while a scholar or follower of a madhhab believes their own position is correct, they acknowledge that other positions could also be valid. This outlook allows for respect between the schools and emphasizes humility in legal interpretations.

Scholars like Anwar Shāh al-Kashmīrī and Shāh Walīullāh took nuanced positions, acknowledging that while there’s only one ultimate truth, multiple valid approaches might coexist, especially in non-essential issues.

Suggested Books on the Topic

For those interested in a deeper exploration of taqlīd, its significance, and the debate surrounding tatabbuʿ al-rukhaṣ, here are some essential works by both classical and contemporary scholars:

• اللامذهبية أخطر بدعة by Shaykh Ramaḍān al-Būṭī
  Al-Lā Madhhabiyya: The Most Dangerous Innovation — A work on the dangers of abandoning the madhhabs, focusing on the modern anti-taqlīd movement.
• اللامذهبية قنطرة اللادينية by Shaykh Zāhid al-Kawtharī
  Al-Lā Madhhabiyya: The Bridge to Secularism — This book examines how rejecting madhhabs can lead to irreligiosity and secularism.
• إعلام الموقعين by Imam Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawzīyya
  Iʿlām al-Muwaqqiʿīn — A text on the importance of following qualified legal experts and the role of jurists in society.
• عمدة التحقيق by Shaykh Saʿīd al-Bānī
  ʿUmdat al-Taḥqīq.
• التمذهب by Shaykh ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ ibn Ṣāliḥ al-Yāfiʿī
  At-Tamadhhub — An exploration of the necessity of following a specific madhhab and the dangers of abandoning it.
• The Legal Status of Following a Madhhab by Mufti Taqī Usmānī — A contemporary work that defends the practice of following a madhhab.
• Understanding Taqlīd by Mufti Muḥammad Sajjād — A simple text that explains the concept of taqlīd in straightforward manner.

Conclusion

These discussions we had in class were thought-provoking and really made me reflect on the nuances of taqlīd and ijtihād. One of the key takeaways is that, technically, a layperson (ʿāmmi) doesn’t have a formal madhhab—their responsibility is simply to seek guidance from qualified scholars without necessarily attaching themselves to one school. However, later scholars emphasized the importance of following a specific madhhab (taqlīd shakhṣī) to prevent confusion and instability in legal rulings, especially as knowledge became more widespread and accessible.

Perhaps the most important point is that both those who follow a madhhab and those who argue against strict adherence to any one madhhab agree on one thing: following “the ḥaqq” (the truth) is necessary. Whether you follow a madhhab or not, everyone believes that what they are following represents the most correct approach, even if they acknowledge that other madhhabs have the potential to be correct. It’s not a contradiction to follow a madhhab while still believing you are adhering to the truth—because, for those who do, the madhhab is simply a structured way to follow what they believe to be the ḥaqq.

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Class date: October 2024, Whitethread London